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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes was seen as a
potential game-changer.1 The lower court had certified the plaintiffs’
million-member class in a lengthy and careful decision that had been
twice affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals2 When the
Supreme Court vacated the class certification, there was a sense that the
decision might mark the death-knell of employment discrimination class
actions based on claims of intentional discrimination.3 This was
* Michael Selmi is the Samuel Tyler Research Professor of Law at George Washington University
Law School. Sylvia Tsakos is a third-year law student at George Washington University Law
School.1. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (U.S. 2011).
2. The en banc decision from which the Supreme Court opinion sprung is available at Dukes
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). A three-judge panel issued an
earlier decision upholding the district court’s class certification opinion. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart,
Inc., 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007). The district court’s certification decision was issued seven
years before the Supreme Court opinion. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D.
Cal. 2004).
3. For a sampling of the initial responses, see Warren Richey, Supreme Court Dismisses
Women’s Class Action Lawsuit Against Wal-Mart, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 20, 2011, at A1
(noting that Marcia Greenberger of the National Women’s Law Center called the ruling “a
devasting decision”); Steven Greenhouse, After the Wal-Mart Decision: Heavy Blow for Big Cases
and Lawyers Who Bring Them, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2011, at B1 (discussing difficulty the Supreme
Court decision posed for future class actions); David G. Savage, Wal-Mart Bias Case Tossed Out:
High Court Makes Filing Class-Action Discrimination Suits Much More Difficult, BALT. SUN, June
21, 2011, at 7A (“Columbia University law professor John Coffee said the Wal-Mart ruling all but
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particularly important since there had been a wave of such cases prior to
the Wal-Mart case.4
The view of Wal-Mart as a game changer has proved inaccurate,
though the decision seems to have significantly affected the number of
case filings.5 The reduction in filings is an important development, but
when one reviews the cases interpreting Wal-Mart, it appears that courts
are proceeding much as they did prior to the Supreme Court decision.
Employment discrimination class actions have never been easy to
certify, nor have they been plentiful, and that remains true today. At the
same time, courts that were receptive to class action claims prior to the
Wal-Mart decision appear to remain receptive after the decision. As a
result of Wal-Mart, the analysis by the lower courts varies somewhat,
but the results are largely the same; to the extent a court would have
certified the claim before the Supreme Court decision it will likely still
be certified. Moreover, various efforts by defense attorneys to stretch the
Wal-Mart decision to have claims dismissed even before a certification
hearing have largely failed, although those efforts have undeniably
escalated in the last several years.6
This development in the law of employment discrimination class
actions may seem puzzling at first glance, but when the Supreme Court
decision is dissected closely, the reason for its limited effect becomes
clear. The Supreme Court based its decision on a general hostility to
class action litigation and, more specifically, to the particular substance
and scope of the Wal-Mart litigation. Indeed, Wal-Mart presented a
perfect storm for the conservative wing of the Supreme Court: a class
sounds the death knell for class-action lawsuits that seek money damages from employers.”).
4. Although the Supreme Court decision was not handed down until 2011, the case was
filed a decade earlier and followed on the heels of high profile discrimination cases (and
settlements) against Home Depot, Texaco, Coca-Cola and a number of other large companies. See
Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment
Discrimination Litigation and its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249 (2003).
5. It is difficult to measure class action filings, not only because there are no statistics on the
number of employment discrimination class actions filed, but also because many cases that include
class allegations may never proceed to class certification. One measure of activity is the annual
report produced by the law firm Seyfarth Shaw, which reviews all published decisions. The 2014
Report indicated that class filings appeared to be down; cases that proceeded as class actions tended
to be smaller; and settlements were also fewer and smaller in nature. This all suggests that Wal-Mart
had a significant effect on filing behavior. See SEYFARTH SHAW, ANNUAL WORKPLACE CLASS
ACTION
LITIGATION
REPORT
2-6
(2014
ed.),
available
at
http://www.workplaceclassaction.com/files/2014/01/CAR-2014.pdf.
6. Prompted by Wal-Mart, defendants have aggressively sought to strike class allegations
from complaints without the benefit of any certification proceeding. See Chen-Oster v. Goldman
Sachs & Co., 877 F. Supp. 2d 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (denying motion to strike); Simpson v. Boeing
Co., 27 F. Supp. 3d 989 (E.D. Mo. 2014) (denying motion to dismiss class claims).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss4/4

2

Selmi and Tsakos: Employment Discrimination Class Actions

2015]

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLASS ACTIONS

805

claim alleging complicated issues of discrimination against a
controversial defendant that was then placed in the hands of Justice
Antonin Scalia. The end result was a blustery decision that, with one
important exception, has been reasonably easy to distinguish and has
produced few converts. The exception was the unanimous part of the
Court’s opinion holding that class claims seeking individual monetary
relief must be certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3),
rather than the far less expensive 23(b)(2) method, and that the cases
cannot rely on a formula to determine damages.7 To date, this part of the
opinion has received little attention, in part because these class cases
take so long to adjudicate, but the switch to 23(b)(3) certification
imposes substantial additional costs on plaintiffs who seek to pursue
class claims.
This Article explores the ramifications of Wal-Mart approximately
five years after the case was decided. While five years hardly provides
definitive data on how the case will be interpreted, it is possible to
identify trends in the cases that have been decided to date—trends that
are likely to provide insight into the future of class action claims. That
future suggests that there will be fewer, and perhaps no, nationwide class
actions in cases that do not involve a clear challenged practice (any such
cases are likely to be disparate impact cases) and that the prospect for
class certification will turn on the strength of the claim presented and the
jurisdiction where certification is sought. All three of these conditions—
no nationwide class actions, the importance of the merits, and the
jurisdiction—were present prior to the Supreme Court decision and
represent only a modest change in direction. Equally important, class
claims based on subjective employment practices remain viable despite
the evident hostility to those claims reflected in Wal-Mart.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH CLASS ACTIONS
In Wal-Mart v. Dukes, Justice Antonin Scalia begins the analytical
portion of the majority opinion by noting, “The class action is an
exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted on behalf of the
individual named parties.”8 If by exception the Court meant empirically
exceptional rather than the norm, no one could dispute that fact. Class
actions have always comprised a small percentage of civil cases,
including in the area of employment discrimination. But the Court—as
7. See Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558-60 (U.S. 2011). See also
discussion infra Part III.
8. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2550 (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979)).
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reflected in the rest of its majority opinion—seems to mean something
different from a mere empirical observation.
To many, and this appears to include a majority of the current
Supreme Court, class actions are aberrational and out of place in the
world of civil lawsuits because they pose certain risks to defendants.9 In
particular, the cost of litigating class actions, combined with the
potential liability to a class of individuals, can place substantial pressure
on defendants to settle cases: not because the claims are meritorious, but
because they are expensive. For example, Wal-Mart was litigated for
nearly ten years before the Supreme Court dismantled the class, and the
company’s potential liability exceeded several billion dollars.10 The
needed investment to litigate such a large claim and the potential
liability places substantial pressure on defendants to settle and, relatedly,
creates incentives for plaintiffs to pursue claims solely with intent to
extract a settlement. This focus, however, on the costs to defendants
ignores the substantial costs and risks to plaintiff attorneys. In the WalMart litigation the plaintiffs litigated the case for ten years and
accumulated substantial costs that were never recouped. No plaintiff
would take on such a case lightly. It is also worth noting that Wal-Mart
did not settle the case during its ten-year life nor was there any
indication that the plaintiffs pursued the case with an eye towards
producing a nuisance settlement. In other words, in the case used to
highlight the problem of class action litigation, there is no indication a
nuisance settlement was ever sought or obtained. To be sure, there is
little question that employers—and their advocates—have a keen interest
in rendering class actions more difficult to bring, but the same cannot be
said for courts, which should be neutral towards the propriety of class
actions. After all, class actions have been a recognized means of
adjudicating collective claims for more than seventy years.11
Class actions and their equivalents have also been central to the
9. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Walking the Class Action Maze: Toward a More Functional
Rule 23, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1097, 1110 (2013) (“By making massive damages liability turn
on the outcome of a single suit, the class action can increase litigation risks so dramatically that
defendants might settle even frivolous or weak class actions rather than take their chances at trial.”).
10. The company’s potential liability was tied to the size of the class. The discrimination
claim was brought pursuant to Title VII, which provides for damages up to $300,000 per individual
for claims of intentional discrimination. The size of the class was hard to pinpoint, and estimates
varied between 500,000 and 1.5 million, which would suggest a potential liability of between $1.5
to $4.5 billion.
11. The precursor to what is now Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was
included in the 1938 rules. For a concise history of the rule, which was overhauled in 1966, see A.
Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality and Declining Access to Justice, 93
B.U. L. REV. 441, 453-54 (2013).
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development of employment discrimination law. Many of the early cases
were, in fact, class claims; though it should be noted that neither the
United States government nor the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission need satisfy the civil procedure requirements of private
litigants, and these government agencies were behind many of the early
cases.12 But many of those early cases sought to resolve classwide
discrimination, and there was rarely any objection to proceeding on a
collective rather than an individual basis.13 One reason for this is that
when an employer’s practice is challenged as affecting a large group of
employees, it is more efficient for all sides to proceed collectively rather
than through hundreds (or thousands) of individual cases.14 Employers
oppose collective actions not because they are more expensive than
individual adjudications but because they are aware that most
individuals would never file claims, even if meritorious; individual
claims are less expensive due to their absence, not because of the
expenses associated with class action litigation. If employers were
forced to choose between a class action claim and thousands of
individual claims, they would almost certainly choose the class action.
But the choice they perceive is different, namely between a class action
and no (or a handful of) individual claims, and for a potential defendant,
that choice is easy.
Most of the early employment discrimination class action cases
were not particularly complicated, and objections to proceeding as a
class were rarely raised—many of the cases either involved a policy that
was clearly facially discriminatory or that required a court to determine

12. Important early cases that proceeded as class actions included Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); E. Texas Motor Freight Co. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977);
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). The well-known disparate impact case,
Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971), appeared to be a class action but neither the Supreme
Court nor the appellate court decision make reference to a class. In General Telephone Co. of the
Northwest, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Supreme Court held that the
EEOC (and by implication the Justice Department) could seek classwide relief without obtaining
class certification. 446 U.S. 318 (1980). Cases in which the United States pursued the equivalent of
class claims included Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
13. One exception was General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, which the Court
relied on extensively in its Wal-Mart decision and is discussed further throughout this Article. 457
U.S. 147 (1982).
14. As one noted class action commentator has explained, “Once organized around the
systemic treatment of women at the giant Wal-Mart firm, the class action was clearly the superior
mechanism to examine a set of institutional practices that either promoted discrimination or allowed
the prospect of discriminatory behavior to foster.” Samuel Issacharoff, Assembling Class Actions,
90 WASH. U. L. REV. 699, 711-12 (2013).
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whether the policy was discriminatory under the law.15 Problems began
to arise when plaintiffs moved away from such challenges and into the
more complex issues of widespread, or classwide, discrimination not
traceable to a single practice—what are often referred to as subjective
employment practices.16 These practices typically involve the exercise of
discretion by company supervisors, often without much formal guidance,
and are the type of practices that were at issue in Wal-Mart.17
This movement to challenge companywide subjective employment
practices began in the 1980s but accelerated after the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, which made damages available for claims of
intentional discrimination, including challenges to subjective decisionmaking. This addition of a damages remedy immediately and
dramatically increased employers’ potential exposure to liability.
Discrimination claims brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act went from being about modest lost wages, backpay, and attorney’s
fees to raising the specter of punitive and compensatory damages of up
to $300,000 per class member.18 This was a substantial change and one
that sparked an interest in class claims of intentional discrimination and
away from disparate impact claims; but it was a change promulgated by
Congress and surely not something courts, as opposed to employers,
should have been concerned about, assuming they sought to apply the
law in a neutral fashion. Many courts did just that, and one aspect of
employment discrimination class action litigation that has proved
problematic is that courts often approach the cases from very different
perspectives. This schism occurred shortly after Congress passed the
1991 Civil Rights Act, as a number of courts concluded that the new
damage remedies rendered class action certification inappropriate
because individual damage issues would predominate.19 This was a
15. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1997) (exclusion of women from male prisons);
Bazemore, 478 U.S. 385 (discriminatory pay policy in place before Title VII became effective
against public employers); City of L.A., Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978)
(women required to contribute more towards pensions because of their presumed longer lifespan).
16. In the Supreme Court, the issue of subjective decision-making came up most directly in
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank, where the Court held that subjective decision-making could be
challenged under the disparate impact model of proof. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
17. As discussed in the next section, the litigation challenged a number of different practices,
but the focus was always on the lack of objective criteria for pay and promotion.
18. The damage provisions that were part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 are included in a
separate statute and provide for damages of up to $300,000 depending on the size of the employer.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(3) (2012). It is always worth adding that the damage caps have not been
altered since 1991 and, taking into account inflation, those damages are now worth about $172,000;
to bring them to parity with the 1991 levels, the caps should be approximately $522,000.
19. The most influential case to hold that the new damage provisions generally rendered
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substantial change from prior practice when the lost wages or backpay
calculations, which always involved individual determinations, were
routinely handled through class proceedings.20 Other courts, however,
determined that the presence of damages did not remove the cases from
appropriate class certification and found a number of ways to certify the
discrimination cases.21 This circuit split created clear incentives for
plaintiffs to file their claims in more receptive jurisdictions and likely
contributed to the pressure to bring nationwide class actions in friendly
locations rather than to proceed in multiple jurisdictions. At this time,
prior to Wal-Mart, courts varied considerably in how they approached
employment discrimination class actions, with some jurisdictions more
receptive than others; the differences in approach seemed to spring from
judicial philosophies rather than any neutral principle of law.
Class actions pose two potential problems that warrant judicial
scrutiny. The rights of absent class members, for example, certainly fits
within a traditional judicial concern; but at the same time, the procedures
established by Congress should satisfy whatever due process concerns
may exist. Indeed, when the Supreme Court created rights for
individuals to challenge prior class settlements during the height of its
civil rights hostility, Congress promptly repudiated that decision.22 The
Supreme Court has never suggested that the procedural protections of
Rule 23 were in conflict with constitutional due process protections, so
even a concern for absent class members seems, at this point in time,
only a tangential judicial interest.23 Nevertheless, it is conceivable that
an individual could find her claim has already been adjudicated through
a class proceeding and would then be denied her day in court. This issue
would arise primarily in a 23(b)(2) class action where the class
employment cases unsuitable for class treatment was Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d
402 (5th Cir. 1998).
20. See, e.g., Senter v. Gen. Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1976); Chisholm v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 665 F.2d 482, 488 (4th Cir. 1981); Gay v. Waiters’ & Dairy Lunchmen’s Union, 549
F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1977).
21. The Second Circuit was the leader in permitting 23(b)(2) certifications with an occasional
nod to what came to be known as a hybrid certification, where the liability phase was certified under
23(b)(2) and the damage phase under 23(b)(3). See Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co.,
267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit, from which the Wal-Mart litigation arose, had
adopted the approach of the Second Circuit. See Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2003).
22. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (permitting collateral challenges to settlement
agreements). The case was one of the cases overturned by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
23. The Supreme Court long ago held that due process requires that absent class members be
given notice and an opportunity to opt out of a class action that might lead to substantial money
damages. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985). For a discussion of
what this due process concern requires, see Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the
Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057 (2002).
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challenged an employer’s practice, such as a written examination, and
failed in that challenge. Ironically, a 23(b)(2) class does not require
notice to class members, but the reason for that is because the class
members are all similarly situated—if the test is valid for one class
member, it is valid for all. Different class members might style their
claims differently, but this is an area where the employer clearly benefits
by having to defend its practice only once rather than fend off multiple
challenges to the same practice. In other words, the rights of absent class
members are of concern to putative plaintiffs, which are typically not the
interests courts hostile to class actions seek to protect.
The other potential problem is even easier to dismiss— the
Supreme Court’s apparent concern that large class actions carry with
them the potential for extortionate claims or what are also referred to as
“blackmail settlements.”24 The argument is relatively straightforward
and has played out for several decades: If the cost of litigating a class
action will generally exceed the cost of a settlement, regardless of the
merits of the claim, some employers (or defendants, more generally) will
take the cheapest route and opt to settle. But this is a basic economic
concept that applies to litigation strategies generally and is not unique to
class actions—whenever litigation costs exceed the likely judgment,
there will be economic pressure to settle the case. It should be noted,
however, that many employers and defendants resist that temptation.
The difference with class actions is twofold. First, the cost of
defending such a claim is likely far higher than the run-of-the-mill
lawsuit, and thus, settlements should likewise be higher with the
concomitant pressure to settle more frequent. This issue has been
extensively addressed in the literature, and suffice it to say, it is not a
simple calculation of when lawsuits, including class actions, will lead to
settlements that are independent of the merits of the litigation.25 To offer
but one simple example: a defendant is likely willing to invest far more
resources in a claim that raises substantial liability costs, compared to a
low-value case that may not justify substantial resources, making a

24. The concept of a “blackmail” settlement in the context of class actions has seeped into
some case law, perhaps most famously in an opinion written by Judge Posner. In re Rhone Poulenc
Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). For a discussion of the potential for a “blackmail”
settlement in the context of the Wal-Mart litigation, see Aaron B. Lauchheimer, A Classless Act:
The Ninth Circuit’s Erroneous Class Certification in Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 71 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 519, 549-52 (2005).
25. See, e.g., John Bronsteen, Some Thoughts About the Economics of Settlement, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 1129 (2009); Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
1 (2002).
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smaller claim more likely to settle.26
The second pressure to settle is related but often treated as
distinct—many employers will opt to settle in order to avoid a massive
judgment even when the probability of suffering such a judgment is
low.27 Risk-averse defendants might opt for settling a low-probability
but potentially substantial judgment case; but it is difficult to see why a
court should seek to protect a defendant in such a situation, simply
because there is much at stake. The response, it would seem, is that
opportunistic plaintiffs are able to turn a modest claim into a substantial
judgment by aggregating hundreds or thousands of weak claims.28 That
may be true, but there are other tools to deal with such a situation,
including motions to dismiss and sanctions, so that courts would not
need to manipulate the standards for class certification in order to protect
defendants from weak collective claims. It is also difficult to overlook
the irony of law-and-economics-oriented judges and scholars
demonstrating sympathy for what they would ordinarily define as an
irrational fear by defendants. Not so long ago, it was a hallmark of law
and economics that a 50% probability of recovering $10,000 should be
treated the same as a 1% probability of recovering $500,000. Apparently
a defendant’s fear of a low-probability but high judgment is now worthy
of judicial protection.29 More to the point, there is simply no evidence
that extortionate claims have been a problem within employment
discrimination class actions. Several studies have documented that
26. For critiques of the basic concept of “blackmail” settlements and explorations of the
many factors that play a role in class action strategies, see Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg,
“Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1377 (2000), and Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and
Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003).
27. A common theme along these lines: “By making massive damages liability turn on the
outcome of a single suit, the class action can increase litigation risks so dramatically that defendants
might settle even frivolous or weak class actions rather than take their chances at trial.” Bone, supra
note 10, at 1110.
28. The Amicus Brief of DRI–The Voice of the Defense Bar filed in the Wal-Mart case made
a similar argument: “The inevitable result is to intensify the pressure that a class certification order
puts on a defendant to settle, making the class action procedure even more attractive for plaintiffs
pursuing frivolous claims.” Brief for DRI–The Voice of the Defense Bar as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 20, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (U.S. 2011) (No. 10277).
29. Rationally calculating the expected value of a lawsuit was one of the original insights of
law and economics scholars. See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1067, 1076-77 (1989).
The incorporation of behavioral economics has altered some of the analysis of rationality. For a
helpful discussion, see Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000).
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settlement rates are roughly similar between civil class actions and civil
claims brought by individuals.30 In the context of employment
discrimination cases, employers likely face more pressure to settle cases
as a result of adverse publicity, an issue courts have generally not seen
fit to consider.31 Some have even questioned the social utility of many
consumer class actions, particularly those that lead to “coupon”
settlements for class members and large fee awards for attorneys, and
Congress addressed some of those issues by passing an act relating to
class actions.32
The fact that Congress acted to rein in what were seen as abusive
filing practices suggests that this is an area best left to legislative redress
rather than restrictive judicial interpretations, a position the Supreme
Court staked out many years ago.33 Even so, there has never been any
suggestion that employment discrimination class actions lead to a large
number of nuisance settlements, and employees do not receive coupons
as part of any settlement. In a study conducted by one of us a number of
years ago, it appeared that the damage remedies created by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 led to a surge of filings and a preference for
monetary over injunctive relief, but there was no indication that large
numbers of weak claims had either been filed or led to substantial
relief.34 If anything, the settlements were too modest to serve as an
adequate deterrent against discriminatory behavior.35
Not only is there some irony in the Supreme Court’s desire to
protect defendants from what they consider “blackmail” settlements, but

30. See Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and Substantive Merits, 51
DUKE L.J. 1251, 1285 n.129 (2002); Silver, supra note 26, at 1401-02.
31. It is always difficult to know what motivates a defendant to settle a claim, and most
defendants are unlikely to state that media attention or public pressure was the cause of a particular
settlement. In studying several large settlements, it appeared to one of us that adverse media
attention often played a substantial role in settlement determinations, particularly in the race
discrimination claim against Texaco. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 1272-74.
32. Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 to address some of the perceived
abuses that arose from class action litigation, including consumer class actions. See Pub. L. No.
109-2, § 2(b), 119 Stat. 4, 5 (2005). The Act has not entirely eliminated abuses attendant to coupon
settlements; for a recent and rather critical discussion, see Judge Posner’s decision in Redman v.
Radio Shack Corp.,768 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2014) (vacating a class settlement).
33. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344-45 (1979) (“[R]espondents argue that
the cost of defending consumer class actions will have a potentially ruinous effect on small
businesses in particular and will ultimately be paid by consumers in any event. These are not
unimportant considerations, but they are policy considerations more properly addressed to Congress
than the Courts.”).
34. Selmi, supra note 4.
35. Id. at 1315 (“[A]t least for the companies studied in this Article, the aggregate settlement
amounts are often too small to provide meaningful deterrence.”).
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the Court has not expressed a similar concern for the ability of plaintiffs
to pursue their claims, which is, after all, the other side of the blackmail
coin. Class actions are designed not only to allow adjudication of claims
that affect a group similarly, they also provide a vehicle for plaintiffs to
pursue claims collectively that would not be economically viable on an
individual basis. This has long been true of employment discrimination
class actions where the monetary loss of salary can be modest—often
too modest to attract competent counsel. As noted previously, in many if
not most circumstances, when a class is not certified, it is unlikely that
individual cases will ever be pursued. This seems at least as substantial a
problem as the potential of nuisance settlements, and yet, in a recent case
involving a class action waiver contained in an arbitration agreement,
the Supreme Court was entirely dismissive of the lack of viability of
individual claims.36 In dissent, Justice Elena Kagan made the argument
that is essentially the mirror image of those who express concern
regarding the pressure on a defendant to settle: “No rational actor would
bring a claim worth tens of thousands of dollars if doing so meant
incurring costs in the hundreds of thousands.”37 If nothing else, this all
goes to show that little is neutral about class actions.
Litigation poses inherent risks of settlement independent of the
merits of the underlying claims, and one might conclude that those risks
are more intense for class actions. How much more intense, no one can
say or predict, and it strikes us as inappropriate that courts would seek to
protect defendants by tightening the reins on class certification,
particularly for employment discrimination claims where there is no
empirical evidence of abuse.38 That is not to say that every employment
discrimination class action is meritorious, but it is to say that the
complexity of the cases and the relief typically sought (injunctive and
monetary) provide some assurance against abusive practices. Equally
important, and related to the developments after Wal-Mart, courts differ
rather substantially in their approaches to class actions; some courts cast
a skeptical eye towards the nature of aggregate litigation while others
approach the cases from a more neutral stance, allowing them to proceed
when the certification rules are satisfied without worrying about
36. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (U.S. 2013)
(dismissing the argument that plaintiffs would “have no economic incentive to pursue their antitrust
claims individually in arbitration”).
37. Id. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
38. Then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor made a similar point in response to a dissenting judge’s
expressed concern for a blackmail settlement following class certification: “The effect of
certification on parties’ leverage in settlement negotiations is a fact of life for class action litigants.”
In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig. v. Visa USA, Inc., 280 F.3d 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2001).
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protecting defendants.
III. THE PROBLEM WITH WAL-MART
For the conservative members of the Supreme Court, Wal-Mart
arrived like a much anticipated birthday present. The case represented
the largest class action employment discrimination claim ever filed, and
the defendant was every liberal’s bête noire: Wal-Mart, notorious in
liberal circles not just for low prices but also for low wages and
destroying Main Street in the process.39 The package was even more
enticing in that the case arrived from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
still regarded as among the most liberal Circuit courts. It would be
difficult for a conservative court to ask for much more, although as it
turned out, there was more.
The case became known for its size (more than a million class
members when the case reached the Supreme Court), but it also involved
complicated issues of statistical proof of discrimination with reliance on
social science findings to stitch together the class. Indeed, the
opportunity for the Court to criticize the social science findings was like
being served an extra piece of birthday cake without even having to ask.
As we will see, the Court jumped into the dispute with both feet without
considering how its opinion might ultimately be interpreted.
Although the case was larger than usual, its underlying allegations
tread on familiar ground. The plaintiffs demonstrated that female
employees at Wal-Mart were disproportionately absent from
management positions; the basic statistic was that although 70% of the
workforce were women, only about one-third of the managers were
women.40 This was known as a “pattern or practice” case, and under the
framework that courts had developed going back some thirty years, this
statistically significant disparity between the workers on the floor and
the workers in the office was sufficient to commence a claim of

39. A cottage industry has arisen around the effects of Wal-Mart and the literature is
substantial. See, e.g., WAL-MART: THE FACE OF TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CAPITALISM (N.
Lichtenstein ed. 2013); ANTHONY BIANCO, WAL-MART: THE BULLY OF BENTONVILLE: HOW THE
HIGH COST OF EVERYDAY LOW PRICES IS HURTING AMERICA (2009); David Neumark, Junfu Zhang
& Stephen Ciccarella, The Effects of Wal-Mart on Local Labor Markets, 63 J. URBAN ECON. 405
(2008). In several jurisdictions, Wal-Mart met heavy protests and legislation designed to compel the
company to pay higher wages and benefits.
40. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2563 (U.S. 2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 146 (N.D. Cal. 2004))
(“Women fill 70 percent of the hourly jobs in the retailer’s stores but make up only ‘33 percent of
management employees.’”).
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intentional discrimination.41 Importantly, those statistics can start a case,
but they do not finish it, and it is necessary for the plaintiffs to provide
some explanation for why the statistical disparities are the product of
intentional discrimination.
This is where Wal-Mart ran aground and where the size became
problematic. Conceptually, a “pattern or practice” case lends itself to
class treatment because it requires the plaintiff to prove that
discrimination was the employer’s “standard operating procedure.”42 But
in most of these cases, particularly the contemporary ones, there is not a
single policy to which one can point as the discriminatory culprit;
instead, it will be the employer’s culture or the cumulative effect of its
practices that perpetuate discrimination within the firm.43 Again, to this
point, there was nothing exceptional about the Wal-Mart challenge, and
in fact, it was patterned after a long series of cases that involved
discriminatory job assignments and promotional practices within grocery
stores where it was common for women to be consigned to cash registers
and departments that did not lead to managerial roles.44
The difficulty with Wal-Mart was demonstrating that the disparities
were the product of discrimination, and this is where the issues regarding
the ultimate merits of the claim and the propriety of class treatment
merged. Although Wal-Mart was notorious for its centralized
distribution practices, it turned out to be just as notorious for
decentralized employment practices. Most of the employment decisions
that the class was challenging were made at the store level, and it was
not so obvious how all of those decisions were related in a way that
would justify class treatment. Store managers individually made hiring,
promotion, and salary decisions within a proscribed range, and those
decisions were formally approved at a regional level in a way that
appeared perfunctory.45 This is where the question the Supreme Court
confronted came into play: What did the million class members have in
common? Could they, for example, point to common practices that had

41. Prior to Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court had established the proof standards for “pattern
and practice” claims in two cases from the 1970s. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324 (1977); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
42. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336.
43. For a discussion of what is sometimes called structural discrimination, see Tristin K.
Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60
VAND. L. REV. 849 (2007).
44. For a discussion of the grocery store cases, which began in the 1970s, see Michael Selmi,
Sex Discrimination in the Nineties, Seventies Style: Case Studies in the Preservation of Male
Workplace Norms, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1 (2005).
45. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2547.
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led to the observed gender disparities, and if so, were those common
practices attributable to the company?
The plaintiffs sought to address these questions by relying on
various forms of evidence, including the social science evidence
referenced earlier. By way of an affidavit submitted by an eminent
sociologist who had been retained as an expert witness, the plaintiffs
sought to show that the discretionary employment system established by
Wal-Mart was the very kind of system that led to discriminatory
results.46 Wal-Mart’s system was described as a classic subjective
employment system in which management level employees, in this
instance primarily store managers, are provided with little guidance on
how to make their decisions and instead rely on their own beliefs and
discretion to hire, promote, and establish salaries. It is well documented
that such a system can lead to discriminatory results when the managers
are men who likely rely on stereotypes for their decisions—stereotypes
such as women are secondary earners, are not likely to be willing to
relocate for a managerial position, and may not even be interested in
promotions. This phenomenon is well established, and although a bit
outdated, there was nothing particularly controversial about the expert
affidavit the plaintiffs submitted.47 To the extent there was a problem,
the argument made against Wal-Mart, which the plaintiffs buttressed
with detailed statistical analyses, could be made against just about any
employer that relied on a non-objective hiring or promotion process.
This may have been the case’s undoing; one could interpret the
plaintiffs’ argument as stating that a discretionary (subjective)
employment system was inherently discriminatory, and that was not an
argument the Supreme Court was likely to accept.
To distinguish Wal-Mart, the plaintiffs relied on about 100
affidavits of class members and some scattered evidence about a culture
at Wal-Mart that included stereotypical thinking about women. That
culture purportedly included references to women at management
46. Id. The plaintiffs’ primary expert on this issue, William Bielby, had been associated with
plaintiff employment discrimination claims for many years. See Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic
Disparate Treatment Law: After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 477, 496-99
(2011).
47. By the time that the case reached the Supreme Court, the Affidavit, which typically did
not have research beyond 2000, appears outdated, but that was just a function of the time the case
took to reach the Court. Although Bielby’s Affidavit accurately described the literature on
discrimination and, in particular, the way unguided discretion can lead to discriminatory results, the
use of such an affidavit to judge a specific workplace has proved controversial. For a defense of the
use of social framework evidence and a discussion of the debate, see Melissa Hart & Paul M.
Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social Framework Evidence in Employment Discrimination Class
Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 37 (2009).
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meetings as “Janie Qs,” holding meetings at strip clubs, and other
similar practices designed to show that women were not taken seriously
as potential management employees.48 But the company’s size and its
decentralized employment practices made this evidence all but irrelevant
even to neutral eyes. The affidavits of one hundred employees—or one
thousand for that matter—do not establish a pattern of discrimination in
a company with several million employees, nor does it transform a
statistical presentation into a compelling case of discrimination. The
expert affidavit, which involved social framework evidence, offered
some assistance, but its generic quality made it difficult to conclude that
Wal-Mart’s system was anything other than “vulnerable” to
discrimination, in the words of the plaintiffs’ own expert.49
We have gone into such detail in order to demonstrate how fact
specific the Wal-Mart case was and to show how the facts led the Court
to write an opinion that has proven relatively easy for lower courts to
distinguish. The very first line of the opinion begins, “We are presented
with one of the most expansive class actions ever,” with the Court
adding, “The District Court and the Court of Appeals approved the
certification of a class comprising one and a half million plaintiffs,
current and former employees of petitioner Wal-Mart who allege that the
discretion exercised by their local supervisors over pay and promotion
matters violates Title VII by discriminating against women.”50 One
sentence later the Court emphasized Wal-Mart’s uniqueness by noting,
“Petitioner Wal-Mart is the Nation’s largest private employer . . . WalMart operates approximately 3,400 stores and employs more than one
million people.”51 Two paragraphs later the Court again mentions that
the named plaintiffs represent “1.5 million members of the certified
class,”52 a fact the Court emphasized again later in the opinion.53
A substantial portion of the opinion—it appears to be more than
half—focuses on the plaintiffs’ factual allegations and evidentiary proof.
In the first four paragraphs, the Court takes note of the “discretion”
vested in managerial decisions four times while also emphasizing the
“subjective” nature of that promotional system.54 The opinion references
supervisor “discretion” on nine additional occasions, making clear that
48. See Brief for Respondents at 19-20, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541
(U.S. 2011) (No. 10-277).
49. Id. at 35-36.
50. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2547.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2555.
54. Id. at 2547.
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one difficulty with certifying this particular class was that the policy at
issue was “discretion” that supervisors might exercise in a variety of
ways. The sheer size of the defendant—3,400 stores employing more
than 1 million people—magnified the problem because, to the Court, it
seemed unrealistic that managers across the country would exercise their
discretion in a similar fashion absent some corporate policy that guided
that discretion. And, as noted above, the plaintiffs’ experts were not able
to say more than that they might do so.
In this setting, it was perhaps natural for the Court to look for a
discriminatory policy promulgated by the company directing the
managers to engage in discriminatory hiring and promotional practices,
but while such a search might be natural, it is inconceivable that any
such policy would be located —not just at Wal-Mart, but at any
company today. Yet, the absence of a discriminatory policy played a
significant role in the Court’s decision. On several occasions, the Court
stated, “The whole point of permitting discretionary decisionmaking is
to avoid evaluating employees under a common standard.”55 Here the
Court was emphasizing the lack of commonality among the gigantic
class, and there was nothing extraordinary about the Court’s conclusion.
Indeed, one could conclude, and it seems that lower courts have moved
in this direction, that the Court’s discussion of the lack of commonality
under Rule 23 did not break any new ground. Rather, the Court was
effectively reviewing the lower court’s decision de novo and determined
that certification was improper because of a lack of commonality.
The Court, however, did not go so far as to conclude that a
subjective decision-making system can never be challenged through a
class action. The problem here was that the nationwide scope of the case
made it particularly difficult to establish a common pattern of decisionmaking. As previously noted, the plaintiffs sought to establish
commonality through expert testimony regarding how subjective
employment decisions often trade on stereotypes that then influence the
decision-making process.56 The evidence was generic in nature as there
was nothing specific about Wal-Mart other than describing its system as
subjective. As a result, this evidence was relatively easy for the Court to
dismiss, particularly as it related to class certification, because the
evidence demonstrated little more than that Wal-Mart relied on
discretion in making its promotional decisions—but that fact was never
in dispute.
55.
56.

Id. at 2553.
Id. at 2547.
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Again, these facts render the case relatively easy to distinguish. One
can read the Court’s decision as holding that certification was
inappropriate in the context of a nationwide class action that challenged
the exercise of unfettered discretion by thousands of different
supervisors located across the country without any common thread. Add
a policy or a clear culture of discrimination and the conclusion might be
different; downsize the scope of the class or even the size of the
employer and the result might also be different; identify a specific
practice or directive that might have informed the decision-making, and
again, one would be looking at a different case.
In contrast to its excessive focus on the facts, the Court’s treatment
of the procedural requirements necessary to sustain a class was relatively
vapid despite its evident hostility. Justice Scalia primarily relied on the
thirty-year old case of General Telephone Co. v. Falcon and sprinkled
the opinion with other cases from that era.57 Although the Court had not
previously addressed the requirements for class certification in a “pattern
or practice” case, Falcon appeared to be an odd choice for such prime
treatment. That case involved what was then known as an “across-theboard” class action where certain employees sought to represent
applicants and employees throughout the company.58 The
“commonality” question at issue in Falcon was whether there were any
common interests between those denied promotions and those denied
jobs.59 More than anything else, the case was about typicality rather than
commonality.60 Indeed, the most extensive discussion of commonality
regarding Falcon is found in the Wal-Mart decision, suggesting this was
an unusual case to make the centerpiece of employment discrimination
class actions and that will also likely make Wal-Mart easier to
distinguish.61
57. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982). The Court also cited Cooper
v. Fed. Res. Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867 (1984).
58. As the Court stated in its opening paragraph: “The question presented is whether
respondent Falcon, who complained that petitioner did not promote him because he is a MexicanAmerican, was properly permitted to maintain a class action on behalf of Mexican-American
applicants for employment whom petitioner did not hire.” Falcon, 457 U.S. at 147.
59. The Court stated, “Respondent’s complaint provided an insufficient basis for concluding
that the adjudication of his claim of discrimination in promotion would require the decision of any
common question concerning the failure of petitioner to hire more Mexican-Americans.” Id. at 150.
60. Id. at 159-60 (“Without any specific presentation identifying the questions of law or fact
that were common to the claims of respondent and of the members of the class he sought to
represent, it was error for the District Court to presume that respondent’s claim was typical of other
claims against petitioner by Mexican-American employees and applicants.”).
61. The Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision upholding class certification also turned to the
Falcon case for guidance, but it did so with a distinctly different approach than the Supreme Court.
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The Court changed the law in one way that will impact class
certification by shifting from 23(b)(2) to 23(b)(3) when damages are at
issue, as they almost always are in employment discrimination class
actions.62 This shift was actually overdue, and plaintiffs got away with
23(b)(2) certifications for many years after their propriety became
dubious. Historically, Title VII class actions have been certified under
23(b)(2) because the statute did not provide for damages; injunctions
were the primary remedy sought by the class. That ended with the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which made damages available
in claims of intentional discrimination, and yet, plaintiffs continued to
seek certification under 23(b)(2) and many courts supported certification
under that provision.63 The primary benefit of a 23(b)(2) certification is
that there is no requirement to notify potential class members unless the
class claim is successful, which offers a substantial cost savings to
counsel for the class.
Yet, in what should have been seen as a highly problematic move,
many plaintiff classes—including the Wal-Mart case—opted to forego
claims for compensatory damages as a way of ensuring that individual
issues did not predominate over class claims so as to certify the claim
under 23(b)(2). This tactic, which potentially relinquished a significant
recovery for some or most class members,64 simply delayed the
inevitable, which was seeking certification under 23(b)(3), a more costly
but certainly not fatal approach. Importantly, contrary to the approach of
several lower courts that found the presence of individualized damages
defeated class certification under any standard, the Supreme Court
clearly held that “individualized monetary claims belong in Rule
23(b)(3).”65
We note that certification under 23(b)(2) had appeal beyond the
Most of the Ninth Circuit’s discussion of Falcon involved the question of whether the district court
should look to the merits of the claim in determining whether class certification was appropriate, a
question the court answered affirmatively. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 58287 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). In this regard, the court stated, “Falcon’s central command requires
district courts to ensure that Rule 23 requirements are actually met, not simply presumed from the
pleadings.” Id. at 582.
62. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558 (U.S. 2011).
63. Such certifications were circuit specific. The leading case permitting certification under
23(b)(2) arose in the Second Circuit. See Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d
147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001).
64. The Supreme Court took note of this rather perverse fact. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2559
(noting that by “declin[ing] to include employees’ claims for compensatory damages in their
complaint” plaintiffs created the possibility that “individual class members’ compensatory-damages
claims would be precluded by litigation they had no power to hold themselves apart from.”).
65. Id. at 2558.
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obvious cost savings. Unlike other types of class actions, employment
discrimination class actions will always seek some change in the
employer’s practices, and that change in the form of an injunction will
run across the class. The clearest example is a challenge to an
employer’s written examination where the employer will have to alter
the examination if the challenge is successful. A case like Wal-Mart that
involves a challenge to subjective decision-making will also require
injunctive relief, but the substance of that relief will often be hortatory
rather than specific in nature, along the lines of requiring the employer
to “do better.” A number of the well-known class action cases led to the
formation of a diversity committee that monitored the employer’s
progress, but it is rare that monitoring is considered more important than
monetary relief.66
IV. WAL-MART IN THE LOWER COURTS
In this section, we seek to illustrate the effect the Supreme Court’s
Wal-Mart decision has had on lower courts, specifically in the context of
class certification issues in employment discrimination claims. Wal-Mart
has been widely cited, but its influence among employment
discrimination cases—as opposed to other kinds of civil actions,
including collective actions filed under the Fair Labor Standards Act67—
appears to have been modest and, one might even conclude, minimal. It
is always difficult to make these kinds of assessments when the available
field for analysis is limited to published decisions, but we believe that in
the context of class certification decisions, relying on available
published decisions is less a limitation than might be true in other areas;
indeed, there is a distinct advantage in trying to measure the effect on
class certifications.
As noted previously, class certifications are relatively rare as
measured against the pantheon of civil cases, and because they are more
substantial, they are also more likely to result in a written decision that is
reported in one of the many legal databases. As a result, if Wal-Mart is
having an effect in the lower courts, it would likely appear among
published decisions. Also, when a district court issues a decision on
class certification, it is always subject to reconsideration as the case
progresses,68 and we can assume that most defendants would have
66. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 1324-25 (discussing and critiquing diversity committees
established as part of class action settlements).
67. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2012).
68. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C) (“An order that grants or denies class certification may be
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moved to decertify a significant percentage of certified discrimination
cases in light of Wal-Mart. The process of decertifying a class provides
an opportunity to determine whether a case might have achieved class
certification before, but not after, the Supreme Court decision and is the
strongest indicator of the influence of that decision.
There has not, however, been a rash of decertification decisions. In
fact, based on the handful of reported cases involving motions to
decertify classes, the requests have failed. Based on published opinions,
we found only one case where a court decertified a class after Wal-Mart.
That case was Ellis v. Costco, which was essentially a copycat case
brought by the same attorneys who sued Wal-Mart, and the original class
certification decision was reconsidered in light of Wal-Mart.69 The
allegations in Ellis paralleled those lodged against Wal-Mart—the
employer had engaged in subjective decision-making informed by a
culture of sex discrimination that affected the company throughout its
nationwide operations.70 In one other case, one minor claim was
decertified while the decision to certify the main claim was affirmed.71
Contrary to rumblings throughout the legal community that WalMart portended the destruction of employment class actions, the
decision has not manifested as a death knell for class certification.
Several lower court decisions, such as McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.72 and Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc.,73
have illuminated postWal-Mart paths to class certification, signaling the
continuing viability of class actions.
In McReynolds, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s
denial of class certification to a class of plaintiffs alleging racial
discrimination under a disparate impact theory.74 Seven hundred
African-American brokers, who were current or former employees of
Merrill Lynch, based their claims on two policies that allegedly served
as a framework for discretionary decisions that influenced compensation
altered or amended before final judgment.”). See Stastny v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267,
276 (4th Cir. 1980) (noting that a court “must be prepared under Rule 23(c)(1) to alter or amend [a
certification order] if the court of the trial on the merits reveals the impropriety of class action
maintenance” and that the reviewing court must likewise be prepared to review the propriety of
class certification).
69. See Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2011) (vacating certification
decision and remanding to district court for application of appropriate standard).
70. Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 240 F.R.D. 627, 634-35, 638 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
71. See Parra v. Bashas’ Inc., 291 F.R.D. 360 (D. Az. 2013).
72. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir.
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012).
73. Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 733 F.3d 105 (4th Cir. 2013).
74. McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 483.
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and were delegated to lower level managers.75 The challenged policies
included a “teaming” policy that allowed brokers in the same office to
form “teams” and determine team membership and an “account
distribution” policy where, upon a broker’s departure from the company,
the company would distribute those accounts to competing brokers with
the best records, as determined by company criteria.76 The lower level
management had a measure of control over how the teaming and account
distribution operated. For example, they could veto teams or provide
input for account distribution criteria—but ultimately, their decisions
were guided by the two companywide policies: “authorization to
brokers, rather than managers, to form and staff teams; and basing
account distributions on the past success” of competing brokers.77
The class alleged that the companywide policies enabled racial
discrimination, thus causing a “disparate impact,” as brokers often
formed their teams along racial lines. As a result, African-American
employees experienced difficulty joining the predominantly white teams,
resulting in a cycle of perpetuating disadvantages—team membership
was associated with higher revenue, more clients, success in competing
for account distribution when a broker left the office, and positive
performance evaluations, which in turn influenced pay and promotions.78
Judge Richard Posner, writing for the court, distinguished the
McReynolds class from the Wal-Mart class primarily based on the
existence of discernible, overarching policies from top management at
Merrill Lynch. The policies served as the framework for discretionary
decisions of lower level managers and brokers. Judge Posner described
Wal-Mart’s holding rather narrowly:
[I]f employment discrimination is practiced by the employing company’s local managers, exercising discretion granted them by top management (granted them as a matter of necessity, in Wal-Mart’s case,
because the company has 1.4 million U.S. employees), rather than implementing a uniform policy established by top management to govern
local managers, a class action by more than a million current and former employees is unmanageable; the incidents of discrimination complained of do not present a common issue that could be resolved effi79
ciently in a single proceeding.

Thus, a policy meant to “govern” local managers’ discretion
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
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differentiates viable employment discrimination class actions that satisfy
Rule 23’s commonality requirement from those with the Wal-Mart
class’s infirmities.80
The McReynolds class alleged two such governing policies
instituted by Merrill Lynch’s top management—the teaming policy and
the account distribution policy. Although discretion was allocated to
brokers and local managers, the teaming and account distribution
policies were practices of the employer, “rather than practices that local
managers [could] choose or not at their whim.”81 The corporate policies
were the overarching guidelines within which local managers and
brokers had to exercise their discretion, whereas Wal-Mart was found to
have lacked a uniform companywide policy by which local managers
had to abide when exercising their delegated discretion in making
employment decisions.82 The common issues under the plaintiffs’
disparate impact theory were therefore whether the policies caused racial
discrimination and whether they were justified by business necessity—
issues “most efficiently determined on a class-wide basis rather than in
700 individual lawsuits.”83
Ultimately, the plaintiffs secured a $160 million commitment from
Merrill Lynch to establish a common fund for the McReynolds class
members, which included “all African-American financial advisers and
financial adviser trainees” employed at the company after May 6,
2011—a class much larger than the 700 individuals to which the
McReynolds decision would have limited class treatment.84 The
80. The court also seems to place emphasis on the size of the employer and the size of the
class as factors that may influence whether class treatment is appropriate. For example, although the
possibility that an employer with millions of employees could institute a companywide policy to
govern the discretion of all its local managers was not ruled out, the court seems to suggest this is an
unlikely situation. Id. at 487. Further, the court seems to consider the size of the class (“more than a
million current and former employees”) as a key factor in finding the Wal-Mart class
unmanageable. Id. at 487. The McReynolds class of 700 current and former employees is miniscule
in comparison.
81. Id. at 490 (finding the case to survive Wal-Mart, which showed “on which side of the line
that separates a company-wide practice from an exercise of discretion by local managers this case
falls”).
82. Id. at 487.
83. Id. at 489-90.
84. Ben James, $160M Merrill Race Case A Road Map for Future Class Actions, LAW360
(Sept. 5, 2013, 7:32 PM), www.law360.com/articles/469131. Although the precise motivations
behind any settlement agreement tend to be rather delphic, the court’s assertion that “should the
claim of disparate impact prevail in the class-wide proceeding, hundreds of separate trials may be
necessary to determine which class members were actually adversely affected by one or both of the
practices and if so what loss he sustained,” and its observation that an erroneous injunction against
Merrill Lynch’s teaming and account distribution policies “could disadvantage it in competition
with brokerage firms that employ similar policies” may have been relevant considerations.
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settlement agreement also incorporated injunctive relief, including
Merrill Lynch’s commitment to scrutinize and restructure its teaming
and account distribution policies, and to implement professional
development programs for its African-American Financial Advisors and
Financial Advisor Trainees.85
Almost two years after McReynolds, the Fourth Circuit weighed in
on the contours of the requirements for class certification under WalMart in Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc.86 The court found allegations
of a uniform corporate policy and decisionmaking from higher-level
management satisfied the commonality requirement for class
certification and kept alive a proposed nationwide class of females who
were current or former Family Dollar Store managers alleging they were
paid less than their male counterparts.87 Their gender discrimination
claims included allegations of disparate impact and pattern-or-practice of
disparate treatment in violation of Title VII.88
The plaintiffs challenged four companywide policies set by
corporate headquarters, including (1) mandatory salary ranges for Store
Managers which allegedly locked in disparities; (2) annual pay raise
percentages that were tied to performance ratings; (3) “‘built-in
headwinds’ compensation criteria for Store Managers” that allegedly
caused a disparate impact; and (4) a “dual pay” compensation scheme
that provided less compensation to individuals promoted to Store
Manager than to individuals hired from outside the company.89
As was true with McReynolds, the district court had initially
granted Family Dollar Stores’ motion to dismiss or strike the class
claims, which argued that dismissal was compelled by the Supreme
Court’s decision in Wal-Mart.90 The district court concluded that, as a
matter of law, the plaintiffs could not satisfy the commonality
requirement under Wal-Mart because they alleged gender discrimination
based on “subjective decisions made at the local store levels.”91
A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s
denial to plaintiffs of leave to amend their complaint, finding the court
McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 491.
85. See Settlement Agreement and Release, McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., No. 05-C-6583, 2012 WL 5278555 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2013) (No. 585-1).
86. See Scott v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 733 F.3d 105, 117 (4th Cir. 2013), reh’g denied,
743 F.3d 886 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2871 (U.S. 2014).
87. Id. at 108.
88. Id. at 108-09.
89. Id. at 110.
90. Id. at 109.
91. Id. at 110 (internal quotations omitted).
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had relied “on an erroneous interpretation of Wal-Mart.”92 The court
declined to interpret Wal-Mart as a per se bar to class certification where
plaintiffs alleged subjective discretion and noted two principles “readily
derived” from the decision. First, where plaintiffs allege subjectivedecision making or discretion, managers must exercise discretion “in a
common way with . . . some common direction.”93 Thus, plaintiffs must
show “the exercise of discretion is tied to a specific employment
practice,” which may include a companywide policy or culture of
discrimination, and that the practice “affected the class in a uniform
manner.”94
The second principle the court derived from Wal-Mart was that
commonality is more likely to be satisfied when “high-level corporate
decision-makers” exercise control over discretionary decisions.95
Drawing on McReynolds, the court noted that high-level corporate
managers instituted Merrill Lynch’s teaming and account distribution
policies, and while local managers exercised an amount of discretion,
their decisionmaking was guided by the companywide policies.96 This
differed from Wal-Mart, in which the plaintiffs did not allege a uniform,
companywide policy guiding each of the independent, local supervisors
at every Wal-Mart store throughout the country who were “vested with
almost absolute discretion over pay and promotion decisions.”97
Plaintiffs here alleged that corporate decision-makers, who had
“authority over a broad segment of Family Dollar’s employees,” had the
requisite control over discretionary decisions.98 For example, corporate
Vice Presidents could grant upward exceptions to salary ranges and
allegedly did so more often in favor of men.99 Additionally, Regional
Managers and Divisional Vice Presidents could grant upward exceptions
to the pay raise percentage and allegedly did so significantly more often
for men.100 The dual pay policy was also a companywide policy in place
at every Family Dollar Store that guided all decisions regarding pay of

92. Id. at 108.
93. Id. at 113 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
94. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
95. Id. at 114.
96. Id. at 115.
97. Id. at 115, 117.
98. Id. at 118.
99. Id. at 116.
100. Id. The court suggests the “Regional Managers” and “Divisional Vice Presidents” are
“high-level corporate decision-makers,” but under the court’s reasoning it may also be sufficient
that the policies they followed in exercising their discretion were instituted at the corporate level,
regardless of whether they are high-level corporate decision-makers.
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hirees and promotees.101
The Scott decision included a concurrence, which specified the
“straightforward and limited” nature of the decision, and a blistering
dissent, which alleged that the majority opinion “drained [Wal-Mart] of
meaning.”102 In her concurrence, Judge Barbara Keenan emphasized
what she considered to be the court’s narrow holding: “that the plaintiffs
should be permitted to amend their original complaint after a dramatic
shift in the law regarding class action certification.”103
Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson’s dissent asserted that under Wal-Mart,
nationwide classes will rarely meet Rule 23’s certification
requirements.104 He considered Scott almost identical to Wal-Mart, as
both proposed classes encompassed thousands of “retail-level” current
and former employees, and alleged discrimination against a national
chain with thousands of stores in more than forty states.105 According to
Judge Wilkinson, the majority opinion unduly limited Wal-Mart to cases
in which low-level managers have complete discretion and implement
their decisions on an “individual store level.”106 In his view, both cases
fail to satisfy Rule 23’s commonality requirement because the
decisionmaking structures were characterized by “dispersed decisionmakers exercising discretion . . . free of direct corporate control and
oversight,” despite some centralized corporate policies that minimally
constrained the decisionmaking.107 Ultimately, the dissent found the
majority opinion punished companies “for nothing more than being
companies” and forewarned that if “centralized delegations of
discretion” and “common management techniques” are “enough for a
nationwide class action to get rolling, then few companies will be
exempt.”108
A third case provides further indication that courts may be likely to
distinguish rather than apply Wal-Mart, but it also suggests some of the
hurdles plaintiffs may face, particularly at the district court level. The
case, Stockwell v. City & County of San Francisco, involved an age
discrimination challenge brought by a group of police officers who
101. Id. at 117.
102. Id. at 119 (Keenan, J., concurring) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
103. Id. (Keenan, J. concurring).
104. Id. at 134-35 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (“The gravamen of [Wal-Mart] is that nationwide
classes face a steep climb to certification under Rule 23” and “class certification could . . . be more
suitable for more modest . . . groups, such as district-level clusters”.).
105. Id. at 120.
106. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
107. Id. at 120, 130.
108. Id. at 120.
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objected to the City’s decision to stop using the results of a 1998
examination because of its disparate impact.109 The district court denied
class certification for lack of commonality, and the Court of Appeals
reversed by exploring the meaning of commonality postWal-Mart.
Relying on Wal-Mart, the court noted that “even a single common
question will do” and added that, while some consideration of the merits
would likely prove necessary, “demonstrating commonality does not
require proof that the putative class will prevail on whatever common
questions it identifies.”110 This distinction between the commonality
inquiry and the merits related directly to the district court’s error in
denying class certification. The district court questioned the relevance of
the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence demonstrating a disparate impact,
suggesting the absence of a regression analysis rendered the evidence of
little probative value.111 The Ninth Circuit, however, saw the issue
differently, noting that whether the plaintiffs could succeed in
demonstrating a substantial adverse impact went to the merits rather than
the certification question of whether the class members had an issue in
common sufficient to warrant class treatment.112 That issue was rather
straightforward: this was a disparate impact case that pointed to the
abandonment of the old test as causing a disparate impact, and all of the
class members would have been eligible for promotion from the old test.
In other words, this was a traditional disparate impact case challenging a
single policy and therefore identifying a common practice sufficient to
satisfy Rule 23(b)(2).113

109. See Stockwell v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 749 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 2014) .
The history of the case and the underlying claim were complicated and a little puzzling. The case
was originally filed in 2008 when the Department began to make promotions for investigation
positions from a new test (Q50) instead of the preexisting list from the earlier exam (Q35). The
purported class was comprised of individuals who were eligible for promotion from the older list,
and they alleged that switching to the new test caused a disparate impact based on age; there were
also allegations relating to a “pattern and practice” claim. The district court denied class
certification, the plaintiffs filed an amended claim, and the district court again denied class
certification; that decision was appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The puzzle is why that process took
six years with a relatively small class and a limited claim.
110. Id. at 1112. Borrowing from its recent decision in the Costco case, the court added:
“‘[W]hether class members could actually prevail on the merits of their claims’ is not a proper
inquiry in determining the preliminary question ‘whether common questions exist.’” Id. (quoting
Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 983 n.8 (9th Cir. 2011)).
111. Id. at 1115.
112. Id.
113. In a case that sought decertification after Wal-Mart in a challenge to a physical fitness
case, the court denied the motion opting instead to create a hybrid class that was certified under
23(b)(2) for liability purposes and 23(b)(3) for damages. See Easterling v. State Dept. of
Corrections, 278 F.R.D. 41 (D. Conn. 2011).
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The significance of the case is the fact that the district court
somehow saw the case differently in light of Wal-Mart , but the two
situations could hardly be more different. Wal-Mart involved a
nationwide claim alleging that the discretion invested in supervisors
created a companywide pattern of intentional discrimination, and
Stockwell involved a single policy implemented by a single employer
that allegedly caused a disparate impact based on age. Courts sometimes
get a decision wrong for any number of reasons, and it may be that the
court here was led astray by the language employed in Wal-Mart, but the
case might also provide a sign of the hurdles plaintiffs may have to
overcome in the postWal-Mart era, even though an appellate court might
be lurking in the wings to help sort things out.114
We do not mean to suggest that Wal-Mart had no effect on
employment discrimination class actions. Cases that closely resemble
Wal-Mart, like the Ellis v. Costco case mentioned earlier, that involve
nationwide challenges to subjective employment practices, are unlikely
to obtain class certification.115 But it is important to emphasize that in
many circuits those claims did not obtain class certification before WalMart, and it seems that jurisdictions receptive to class actions have many
ways to distinguish the case. We also suggest that plaintiffs must
reconsider how they use so-called social framework evidence, given how
hostile the Supreme Court was to the use of such evidence in the WalMart litigation. Social framework evidence is designed to explain how
discrimination infiltrates work cultures even without overt expressions
of bias, and the evidence can prove enlightening to courts or juries who
are likely unaware of just how pervasive discrimination remains. It is too
early to know how plaintiff attorneys might retool this evidence, but it
would certainly be helpful if plaintiffs were able to make specific claims
about the particular defendant’s practices rather than offering what
amounts to a generic lecture on the nature of contemporary
discrimination. Given that the Court’s criticism of the social framework
evidence was clearly dicta, it is also quite possible that some courts will
permit the use of the evidence in its unvarnished previous form.
One other development is worthy of note. Following the Supreme

114. Stockwell v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. C-08-5180 PJH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
117234 (N.D. Ca. Oct. 11, 2011).
115. One such claim involved a gender discrimination challenge to the hiring of entry-level
sales associates against the company Cintas. In denying class certification the court noted, “As in
Dukes, the gravamen of [the plaintiffs’] claims is not that . . . objective criteria led to an anti-female
bias but that subjective decisions made by some of Cintas’s managers favored males because of
Cintas’s male-dominated culture.” Davis v. Cintas Corp., 717 F.3d 476, 488 (6th Cir. 2013).
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Court’s decision in Wal-Mart, the plaintiffs began to file smaller
regional class actions across the country to get around the notion that the
problem with its nationwide class was primarily its size. As noted above,
lower courts have seized on the size of the Wal-Mart class as a way of
limiting the influence of that case, and yet, that has not been true of the
courts that have tackled the regional Wal-Mart claims, all of which to
date have failed to gain class certification.116 It is not easy to reconcile
the consistent treatment of these regional class actions with other cases
courts have certified as class actions except to suggest that the damning
language in the Supreme Court decision regarding the plaintiffs’ claims
may be too difficult to ignore or distinguish in the splintered cases.
V. CONCLUSION
Class actions are an important, if imperfect, means of eradicating
systemic workplace discrimination. As discussed above, many, and this
seems to include a majority on the Supreme Court, see class actions in a
very different light; namely, as a means to extort vulnerable employers
to settle dubious claims. This latter view informed the Supreme Court’s
decision in Wal-Mart, but lower courts sympathetic to class action
claims have found ways to distinguish that case and to continue to
certify claims that share a common core. In other words, Wal-Mart did
not fundamentally change the class action landscape; rather, courts will
likely continue to approach class action claims much as they did before
the case was decided.

116. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (smaller class
dismissed); Love v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 12-61959-Civ., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143234
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2013); Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 875 (M.D. Tenn. 2013);
Odle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-2954-O, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159351 (N.D. Tex. Oct.
15, 2012), rev’d, 747 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 2014).
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